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In re Christensen, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 111 (Dec. 28, 2006)1
 




Pursuant to NRAP 5, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada 
certified five questions to the Nevada Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of NRS 
21.090(1)(g), which provides for the exemption of a certain percentage of a debtor’s disposable 




The Nevada Supreme Court answered the five questions as requested.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 




Chad and Tina Christensen filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7, Title 11 of the United 
States Code on May 12, 2004.  At that time, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate, Stan Pack, 
requested that the Christensens turn over $889.72 in funds they held in four separate bank 
accounts.  Subsequently, the Christensens amended their Schedule C, asserting that 75 percent of 
these funds were exempt pursuant to Nevada’s earning exemption statute, NRS 21.090(1)(g).  
Further, Mr. Christensen submitted an affidavit declaring that the sole source of the bank account 
funds was employment earnings.2  However, Pack filed an objection asserting that the 
Christensens lost their exemption when the earnings were paid and the funds were deposited.   
Shortly following a bankruptcy hearing on June 1, 2005, the Nevada Legislature signed 
Senate Bill 173 into law on June 6, 2005, thereby amending NRS 21.090(1)(g) to clarify that 
proceeds of exempt earnings retain the exemption upon deposit into the debtor’s bank account.  
Thus, the parties filed briefs concerning the effect of these amendments on NRS 21.090(1)(g).  
Pack asserted that the amendment only applied to the deposit from the most recent pay period 
before filing.  The Christensens argued that NRS 21.090(1)(g), as clarified by S.B. 173, allowed 




 On July 1, 2005, Sharon Edmonson filed a petition for voluntary bankruptcy, claiming a 
75 percent exemption of her $1,050.00 bank account balance.3  She claimed the sole source of 
                                                 
1 Summarized by Erin Phillips 
2 This included a $1,000 deposit on May 11, 2004.   
3 The parties later stipulated that Edmonson’s balance upon filing was actually $1,322.62 due to outstanding 
transactions.   
the bank account funds was earnings from her biweekly salary, which was directly deposited into 
her account.4  The trustee to the bankruptcy estate, James Lisowski, subsequently filed an 
objection to the exemption, contending that NRS 21.090(1)(g) as amended only applied to 




On July 1, 2005, Angela Sokolowski filed for voluntary bankruptcy.  At that time, she 
claimed a 75 percent exemption of funds totaling $1,691.96, which she held in three separate 
bank accounts.  The parties stipulated that the funds held in these accounts were directly 
traceable to semi-monthly direct deposits made by Sokolowski’s employer.  As appointed 
trustee, Lisowski filed an objection to the exemptions, asserting that NRS 21.090(1)(g) as 
amended only applied to earnings from the most recent week and not the semi-monthly pay 
period.   
Pursuant to the issues presented in these cases, the bankruptcy court certified five 
questions to the Nevada Supreme Court.  As a threshold question, the bankruptcy court asked 
whether NRS 21.090(1)(g), prior to its 2005 amendments, only protected unpaid earnings from 
partial garnishment, or instead, did it extend such exemptions to property that could be identified 
as direct proceeds of earnings.  If the court extended the exemption to direct proceeds of 
earnings, four additional questions were posed: whether the exemption protected only proceeds 
of the most recent deposit or all deposits; how long the exemption continued and whether it 
extended to subsequent forms of proceeds; whether the commingling of proceeds in an account 
with nonexempt funds destroyed the exemption; and how Nevada law identified which portion of 




Nevada’s wage garnishment exemption is rooted in the state constitution;5 however, the 
state legislature enacted the first exemption statute in 1911.  The apparent purpose of this initial 
statute was to protect a portion of the debtor’s earnings to support himself and his family.6  
Later, the Nevada Legislature opted out of the federal exemption scheme and instead enacted 
NRS 21.090(1)(g), which provided that 75 percent of a judgment debtor’s disposable earnings 
for any pay period were exempt from execution.  In 2005, the legislature amended this statute 
through the enactment of Senate Bill 173,7 which changed the term “pay period” to “workweek,” 
exempted 75 percent of earnings for that week, and defined the term “earnings.”8  
                                                 
4 However, statements from her account revealed deposits from an unidentified source and therefore, parties did not 
stipulate that the entire balance of the account was directly traceable to disposable earnings.   
5 “The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, 
exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for payment of any debts…”  Nev. Const. art. 1, § 
14. 
6 See In re Galvez, 990 P.2d 187, 188 (Nev. 1999).   
7 The amended statute is only applicable to the Edmonson and Sokolowski matters because the Christensens filed 
prior to the enactment of S.B. 173.   
8 “‘Earnings’ means compensation paid or payable for personal services performed by a judgment debtor in the 
regular course of business, including, without limitation, compensation designated as income, wages, tips, a salary, a 
commission or a bonus.  The term includes compensation received by a judgment debtor that is in the possession of 
the judgment debtor, compensation held in accounts maintained in a bank or any other financial institution or, in the 
case of a receivable, compensation that is due the judgment debtor.”  2005 Nev. Stat., ch. 290, § 5, at 1015. 
Question 1 
 
The first question addressed by the court was whether the pre-amended NRS 
21.090(1)(g) extended to property that could be identified as direct proceeds of earnings.  In 
response, the court rejected the claims of the trustees that the earnings lost exemption protection 
once they were deposited into the debtor’s bank account.  The court analogized the issue to its 
decision in Security National Bank v. McColl,9 where it held that veteran’s benefits did not lose 
exempt status under federal law when deposited into a bank account.10  There, the court relied on 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co.,11 which held that 
Congress intended to permit veterans to protect their benefits through normal modes of 
safekeeping, provided that the benefits were not converted into permanent investments.  
Accordingly, the benefits did not lose exempt status once deposited into an interest-bearing 
account with a federal savings and loan association.12  The court further stated that similar 
rationale has been employed by other state courts.  For example, the Iowa Supreme Court has 
noted that the logistics of modern-day living often require an individual to first deposit his 
earnings into a bank account before he can spend these funds.13   
 Moreover, the court noted that Nevada bankruptcy courts have held that proceeds of 
earnings retain their exempt status when deposited into a bank account either by the debtor’s 
employer or the debtor himself.  As explained by the bankruptcy court in the case of In re 
Norris,14 despite NRS 21.090(1)(g)’s silence on the issue, the historical purpose of the 
exemption statute was to ensure that the debtor could retain basic life necessities for himself and 
his family.  Thus, the Norris court held that a deposit of earnings by the debtor’s employer 
should not affect their exempt status provided that they are directly traceable to such earnings.15  
Similarly, in In re Shuey,16 the court extended the exemption to cover deposits by an employer 
into a “Savings Plan.”  These payments accumulated over a thirteen-month period and were then 
paid to the employee in a lump sum.17  Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court held that the funds 
retained in the account were direct proceeds of exempt property and therefore also exempt.18    
 Finally, the court reasoned that the 2005 statutory amendments further supported a 
legislative intent to extend exempt status to earnings deposited into a bank account.  By 
specifically including compensation held in bank accounts in its definition of “earnings,” the 
court determined that the impetus behind S.B. 173 was to clarify the legislature’s original intent 
in enacting NRS 21.090(1)(g).19  As such, the court concluded that the pre-amended NRS 
21.090(1)(g) created a garnishment exemption for 75 percent of earnings that extended to 
property that was considered direct proceeds of such earnings.    
                                                 
9 385 P.2d 825 (Nev. 1963). 
10 Id. at 826. 
11 370 U.S. 159 (1962).   
12 Id. 
13 MidAmerica Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1989). 
14 203 B.R. 463, 467-68 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996). 
15 Id.  
16 No. 03-52753, 2005 Bank. LEXIS 1011 (Bankr. D. Nev. June 8, 2005). 
17 Id. at *1-3. 
18 Id. 
19 The court explained that “[w]here a former statute is amended, or a doubtful interpretation of a former statute 
rendered certain by subsequent legislation, it has been held that such amendment is persuasive evidence of what the 
Legislature intended by the first statute.”  In re Christensen, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 111 (Dec. 28, 2006) (quoting 
Sheriff v. Smith, 542 P.2d 440, 443 (Nev. 1975). 
Question 2 
 
Next, the court addressed whether NRS 21.090(1)(g), both pre- and post-amendments, 
only applies to the most recent deposit, a portion of the deposit, or all deposits.  Prior to the 2005 
amendments, the statutory language exempted 75 percent of the disposable earnings during any 
pay period.  Pursuant to the enactment of S.B. 173, the word “pay period” was substituted with 
the word “week.”20  However, it retained the modifier “any,” therefore denouncing the trustees’ 
claim that the exemption is limited only to deposits from a particular pay period or workweek.  
Thus, in light of the court’s policy of construing statutes liberally in favor of the debtor, it held 




The third question the court addressed was how long the exemption continues and 
whether it extends to other forms of proceeds.  The court primarily relies on the fact that NRS 
21.090(1)(g) and relevant case law remain silent on the issue of how long an asset may remain 
exempt, unlike the codes and case law of other states.  Thus, the court took this silence to 
indicate a legislative intent not to impose temporal limitations on exemptions.  Furthermore, the 
court again looks at the Supreme Court case of Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co.,21 which posed a 
similar issue.  There, the Supreme Court concluded that veteran’s benefits deposited into a bank 
account retained their exempt status provided that they “remained subject to demand and use as 
the needs of the veteran support and maintenance required.”22  The benefits lost their exemption 
once they were transformed into permanent investments and no longer retained the quality of 
money.23  Based on this analysis, the court determined that the NRS 21.090(1)(g) exemptions 
extend indefinitely as long as they can be traced by a recognized accounting method.24   
However, as to the second portion of the question, the court refused to extend the 
exemption to subsequent forms of proceeds.  The court explained that NRS 21.090(1) 
specifically provided for any additional exemptions and therefore, it was without power to 
extend the reach of the statute.  Furthermore, NRS 21.090(1)(g) only protects traceable proceeds; 
therefore, property is not exempt merely because it was purchased with proceeds from the 
exempt earnings.  Moreover, the legislative purpose of providing funding for ordinary living 
costs is undermined if these proceeds are converted into permanent investments.  As such, the 




 Next, the court considered whether the commingling of proceeds from exempt earnings 
with non-exempt funds destroys their exempt status.  The court noted that NRS 21.090(1)(g) is 
silent on the issue of commingling, unlike other exemption statutes.  For example, NRS 
                                                 
20 The court explained that the amendment was clearly intended to reverse its decision in In re Galvez, where it held 
that NRS 21.090(1)(g) only applied to earnings that were “periodic” in nature and therefore the statute did not 
exempt the debtor’s real estate commission that was in escrow at the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.  115 Nev. 
417, 990 P.2d 187 (1999).   
21 370 U.S. 159 (1962).   
22 Id. at 161.   
23 Id. 
24 These accounting methods are discussed in response to question five.   
612.710(2) provides an exemption for unemployment compensation benefits as long as they are 
not commingled with other funds.  Pursuant to basic principles of statutory construction,25 the 
court concluded that the omission of this restriction in NRS 21.090(1)(g) was intentional.  
Moreover, the court noted that the significant majority of courts only strip commingled funds of 
exempt status when tracing is not possible.  In line with the majority view, the court held that 
proceeds of earnings remained exempt despite commingling with non-exempt funds provided 




 Lastly, the court addressed how Nevada law would trace the proceeds of exempt 
earnings.  The court rejects the debtors’ suggestion of a case-by-case approach in favor of a 
single method of tracing to circumvent an increase in litigation.  Because NRS 21.090(1)(g) is 
silent in regard to tracing methods, the court looked to four general approaches.  The first 
approach was the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR), which requires that the exempt fund 
never exceed the lowest balance during the time between the deposit of the exempt amount and 
the time of the levy.26  However, the court declined this method because it is more relevant to 
conversion actions and not particularly useful for wage exemption statute.  The second approach 
was the pro-rata method, which attributes withdrawals to exempt and non-exempt funds based on 
their respective proportions within the account.  However, the court rejected this approach 
because it failed to sufficiently protect the rights of creditors.  The third approach was the last-in, 
first-out (LIFO) approach, which assumes that the last funds deposited into the account are the 
first funds used.  The court also declined this method as a less workable approach.  Accordingly, 
the court settled on the first-in, first-out (FIFO) method, which assumes that the first funds 
deposited into an account are the first funds paid out.  The court reasoned that this approach 
ensured that debtors can meet the expense of life necessities while at the same time recognizing 




 The court addressed and resolved each of the five certified questions posed by the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada.  As a threshold matter, the court concluded 
that NRS 21.090(1)(g), in its original and amended versions, applies to the proceeds of earnings 
deposited into a debtor’s bank account.  These exemptions apply to all deposits and are not 
limited to the most recent pay period or workweek.  Additionally, deposited earnings remain 
exempt indefinitely provided they are traceable and not converted into subsequent forms of 
proceeds.  Further, these earnings retain exempt status despite being commingled with non-
exempt funds as long as tracing is possible.  Finally, the court adopted the first-in, first-out 
(FIFO) approach for tracing exempt funds within commingled accounts.   
                                                 
25 The court relies on the principle that the omission of a qualifier within a statute is presumed intentional if the 
qualifier is included in another similar statute.   
26 Even though new deposits might be exempt funds, they will not replenish the initial exempt fund.   
